Varient
Guru for Geeks
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- Apr 17, 2003
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I think the depressing part for me is the fact that we really are in trouble as a nation.
We are REALLY at a point where we needd to stop the greed fest as a country and put it all in one sock.
We will faill because:
EVERYONE wants theirs - and there can be no bending to perserve what we do have because NO ONE in the process of trying to gain more believe that it could be that bad.
(Reference the results of this kind of thinking - The Long Depression - The Great Depression - etc,..)
Lessons from history - ref [The Crisis through the Lens of History by Charles Collyns]
"So what can history teach us about containing the damage and minimizing downside risks to the global economy? The first and most important lesson from every financial crisis since the Great Depression is to act early, to act aggressively, and to act comprehensively to deal with financial strains. The priority must be to quench the fire, even if unorthodox measures are needed that would not be applied other than in the context of a systemic event. As former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers said, when markets overshoot, policymakers must overshoot too. Thus, the Great Depression became so great in part because for four years after the stock market crash of 1929, policymakers followed orthodox policies that allowed credit to shrink, banks to collapse, and the crisis to feed on itself. Policymakers today are very aware of this chilling precedent, including Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, who has studied the period closely to help strengthen understanding of how financial and real sectors of the economy interlink (Bernanke, 1983).
A more recent cautionary tale is provided by Japan in the 1990s, where the impact on bank and corporate balance sheets of the collapse of the house and equity price bubbles was allowed to go unaddressed for many years, contributing to a decade of weak growth (see “The Road to Recovery: A View from Japan,” pp. 24–25, in this issue). A more positive case was the vigorous response to the Nordic banking crises of the early 1990s, which created the conditions for strong economic revival after a sharp downturn (see “Stockholm Solutions,” pp. 21–23, in this issue).
A second important lesson is the value of providing macro-economic support in parallel with financial actions. With the effectiveness of monetary policy limited by financial disruptions, fiscal stimulus must play an important role to help maintain the momentum of the real economy and curtail negative feedbacks between the financial and real sectors. Indeed, increasing interest is now being paid to boosting infrastructure spending, akin to the public work programs of the Depression era. But, as the Japanese example makes clear, macroeconomic support by itself provides only breathing room, not a cure; it is essential to use the space provided to address the underlying financial problems or the outcome will be a series of fiscal packages with diminishing impact. And it should also be recognized that there will be limited space for macroeconomic responses in countries where the weakness of public sector management has been an integral source of the problem, as has often been the case in emerging market crises.
The third lesson is the need for policy solutions that work at the global level. Again, the Great Depression provides a classic example of what not to do: the “beggar-thy-neighbor” tariff hikes following the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in the United States, which contributed to the international transmission of the crisis around the world. Other examples of the negative contagion effects of one country’s policy decisions on other countries can be drawn from the Latin American debt crises since the 1980s and from the Asian crisis."
I copied that to say this:
In order for us to have the room to dig our way out of this mess,.. we HAVE to turn in toward ourselves,.. SUPPORT our own, Buy our own FIRST to support what we have before trying to REPAIR the damage,... THEN CONTINUE to do the stupidity that allows people to become part of the slightly growing rich.
Peace.
We are REALLY at a point where we needd to stop the greed fest as a country and put it all in one sock.
We will faill because:
EVERYONE wants theirs - and there can be no bending to perserve what we do have because NO ONE in the process of trying to gain more believe that it could be that bad.
(Reference the results of this kind of thinking - The Long Depression - The Great Depression - etc,..)
Lessons from history - ref [The Crisis through the Lens of History by Charles Collyns]
"So what can history teach us about containing the damage and minimizing downside risks to the global economy? The first and most important lesson from every financial crisis since the Great Depression is to act early, to act aggressively, and to act comprehensively to deal with financial strains. The priority must be to quench the fire, even if unorthodox measures are needed that would not be applied other than in the context of a systemic event. As former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers said, when markets overshoot, policymakers must overshoot too. Thus, the Great Depression became so great in part because for four years after the stock market crash of 1929, policymakers followed orthodox policies that allowed credit to shrink, banks to collapse, and the crisis to feed on itself. Policymakers today are very aware of this chilling precedent, including Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, who has studied the period closely to help strengthen understanding of how financial and real sectors of the economy interlink (Bernanke, 1983).
A more recent cautionary tale is provided by Japan in the 1990s, where the impact on bank and corporate balance sheets of the collapse of the house and equity price bubbles was allowed to go unaddressed for many years, contributing to a decade of weak growth (see “The Road to Recovery: A View from Japan,” pp. 24–25, in this issue). A more positive case was the vigorous response to the Nordic banking crises of the early 1990s, which created the conditions for strong economic revival after a sharp downturn (see “Stockholm Solutions,” pp. 21–23, in this issue).
A second important lesson is the value of providing macro-economic support in parallel with financial actions. With the effectiveness of monetary policy limited by financial disruptions, fiscal stimulus must play an important role to help maintain the momentum of the real economy and curtail negative feedbacks between the financial and real sectors. Indeed, increasing interest is now being paid to boosting infrastructure spending, akin to the public work programs of the Depression era. But, as the Japanese example makes clear, macroeconomic support by itself provides only breathing room, not a cure; it is essential to use the space provided to address the underlying financial problems or the outcome will be a series of fiscal packages with diminishing impact. And it should also be recognized that there will be limited space for macroeconomic responses in countries where the weakness of public sector management has been an integral source of the problem, as has often been the case in emerging market crises.
The third lesson is the need for policy solutions that work at the global level. Again, the Great Depression provides a classic example of what not to do: the “beggar-thy-neighbor” tariff hikes following the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in the United States, which contributed to the international transmission of the crisis around the world. Other examples of the negative contagion effects of one country’s policy decisions on other countries can be drawn from the Latin American debt crises since the 1980s and from the Asian crisis."
I copied that to say this:
In order for us to have the room to dig our way out of this mess,.. we HAVE to turn in toward ourselves,.. SUPPORT our own, Buy our own FIRST to support what we have before trying to REPAIR the damage,... THEN CONTINUE to do the stupidity that allows people to become part of the slightly growing rich.
Peace.